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Steven DeCaroli: Assuming Identities 
enhance security for its citizens, how much freedom should be given to the gov-
ernment to monitor phone lines, to access private email messages, to require that 
every citizen carry and display a government-issued identification card, and to 
employ other forms of surveillance in order to monitor their activities? Such ques-
tions have no easy answers. But it is critical that such questions be raised, and that 
the answers arrived at be subjected to careful examination. 
Reading Questions 
1. According to DeCaroli, how have technological innovations begun to "destablize" 
our conception of privacy? How have methods of gathering personal information through 
the use of computer technology begun to blur the distinction between what is "public" 
and what is "private"? 
2. Why does DeCaroli believe that there is a (at least potential) dilemma between the 
desire to live in a society in which personal privacy is guaranteed, and to live in a society 
safe from criminal activity? What specific example(s) does he use to illustrate this claim? 
3. DeCaroli notes that "security is always a matter of access." What does he mean by 
this? What sorts of problems are generated by the desire to make something (e.g., personal 
information) both secure and accessible? 
4. What does DeCaroli mean by "forged membership"? Why does he believe that 
"many, if not most, security threats ... can productively be understood as a form of forged 
membership"? 
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I 
A central organizing principle of Western political 
thought since classical antiquity has been the distinc-
tion between the public and the private. As far back 
as the Homeric epics, the Greek language has recog-
nized a basic distinction between those activities of 
an individual performed for personal reasons and 
those actions undertaken by an individual in the 
service of a public office. When, in the Odyssey, 
Menelaus asks Telemachus if his quest is done for 
public or private reasons (demion e idion) Homer is 
making just such a distinction.l Here the Greek idios 
refers specifically to that which is "one's own," to 
that which "pertains to one's self," while the word 
for public, demios, denotes that "having to do with 
the people [as a whole]."2 
1Homer, Odyssey, 4.314. 
While there is much in the Greek terminology that 
overlaps with our modern usage of the terms public 
and private, it would be a mistake to assume that the 
meaning attributed to the terms of this dichotomy 
have remained stable. As Barrington Moore has 
shown, the use of the term for that which is private, 
idios, did not carry for the ancient Greeks the positive 
overtones that it would acquire, for instance, in the 
political writings of the Natural Law theorists of the 
seventeenth century.3 In fact, evidence of the negative 
2Liddell and Scott, Greek-English Lexicon (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1977). 
3Barrington Moore, Jr., Privacy: Studies in Social and Cultural 
History (London: M. E. Sharpe, 1984), 82. 
Steven DeCaroli, "Assuming Identities: Media, Security, and Personal Privacy." Reprinted by permission of 
the author. 
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connotation that idios had for the ancient Greeks can 
be observed in the etymological history of its noun 
form, idiotes, which comprises the root of the English 
derogative, idiot. For the Greeks, private life was a de-
rogatory designation directly associated with the la-
borer, the layman, and with those who did not hold 
public office and could not, therefore, participate in 
the political life of the polis. Today, however, in the 
United States at least, it is public life, that is to say, 
political life and its institutions, that often are consid-
ered a threat to private life insofar as actions taken on 
behalf of public interests are very often interpreted as 
encroachments into private matters. 
The values attributed to the public and the private 
are, therefore, contingent upon the specific context in 
which they appear. Attempts to determine a priori the 
values associated with the private or the public are 
bound to fail, not only because the respective virtues 
of private life and public life vary greatly from cul-
ture to culture and epoch to epoch, but also because 
the specific content associated with each of these so-
cial jurisdictions cannot be abstractly determined. 
The most one can say is that, at a basic level, the pri-
vate and the public are reciprocally determined con-
cepts-in other words, that which is not considered 
to be public is, by and large, deemed to be private 
and that which is not private is considered public. 
Consequently, the content appropriate to the public 
and the private varies greatly from one community to 
another, for almost anything one can think of can be 
considered, at one time or another, or in one possible 
community or another, a matter of privacy or public-
ity. Those aspects of life that the modern West deem 
to be most private, bathing and defecation, for in-
stance, were regularly performed in public in ancient 
Rome, often in the open air and visible to all. To sim-
ply say that in adopting these practices the Romans 
did not recognize privacy would clearly be mistaken. 
The point is simply that privacy does not correspond 
to a fixed content, but rather is the outcome of cus-
toms specific to individual communities. While life in 
all political communities is characterized by mem-
bers who simultaneously inhabit public and private 
social jurisdictions, the explicit content of these juris-
dictions, and particularly that of the latter, remains 
impossible to specify in the abstract. 
Given that the value and meaning of privacy have 
undergone dramatic changes throughout Western his-
tory, it is worth considering how, and to what extent, 
current transformations in modern society continue to 
affect our basic understanding of privacy, and to esti-
mate how this understanding influences the ethical 
and legal claims we make regarding it. But before dis-
cussing the contemporary relevance of privacy, or 
more specifically, before examining how technological 
innovations in data accumulation and filtering, 
coupled with the influence of rapid and pervasive me-
dia coverage, have begun to destabilize our concep-
tion of the term, it is important to first examine the 
modern genealogy of the concept so as to illustrate 
how privacy, in conjunction with its reciprocal con-
cept, publicity, came to play a central role in the for-
mation of modern liberalism. It is only after one has a 
clear sense of how the concept of privacy has been 
used in recent times that one can accurately identify 
the ways in which it is currently being altered. 
Following a discussion of how modern liberalism 
established formal conditions for thinking about pri-
vacy, particularly through efforts to secure the safety 
of persons and property, I will consider how modern 
methods of gathering personal information through 
. the use of computer technology have begun to blur 
the line between what is public and what is private. 
In the process, particular attention will be paid to is-
sues raised by, on the one hand, the widespread de-
sire to live in a society where robust individual pri-
vacy is guaranteed, and on the other hand, the 
equally common aspiration to live in a society safe 
from criminal (i.e., intentionally harmful) activity of 
all types . The dilemma that lies at the heart of these 
two demands arises from the fact that, in order to 
maintain the conditions necessary to fulfill the sec-
ond demand, the goals of the first demand must be 
compromised. Creating a secure society requires, at 
some level, the use of surveillance not only to ob-
serve actions, but more essentially, to identify and 
keep track of individuals who perform these actions. 
The very means by which individuals are monitored, 
however-be it through security cameras and tax au-
dits, or through the apparently more benign practices 
of issuing driver's licenses, passports, and even birth 
certificates-are precisely the means whereby indi-
vidual privacy is intruded upon. In determining how 
much information ought to be gathered about indi-
viduals within a society, one is forced to weigh the 
harm, or potential harm, done by gathering such data 
against the harm prevented by gaining information 
which might assist in preventing certain harmful ac-
tivities from occurring. 
Due, however, to the exponential advancement 
and development of new technological means of sur-
veillance and information analysis, it is becoming 
less and less clear where private life ends and where 
public life begins-particularly because marketing 
agencies, credit companies, commodity retailers, as 
well as the private media have, in numerous respects, 
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surpassed the state in monitoring and analyzing our 
behaviors. With the appearance of ever more efficient 
means of gathering and processing information not 
only has it become less clear exactly how much per-
sonal information is actually being accumulated 
about us in the course of our regular, day-to-day ac-
tivities, but non-governmental organizations are in-
creasingly able to compete with the state in gathering 
together publicly available information into vast re-
positories of raw data. By sorting through this daunt-
ing amount of information with the assistance of 
sophisticated software, non-governmental organiza-
tions are able to extract greater and greater levels of 
informational value, or "resolution," about our lives 
from data which only a few decades ago would have 
been dismissed as random and meaningless. Since 
virtually every aspect of economic a,nd social life in 
the United States generates a record, and is therefore 
subject to inclusion in an informational database, it is 
incumbent upon us to reassess the so-called "right to 
privacy" in terms of a number of difficult and in-
creasingly urgent questions: Who has the right to ac-
cess personal information? To what purposes ought 
this information be applied? Under what conditions 
does private information become public? Is personal 
information a type of property? And if so, how does 
one claim legitimate ownership? And finally, what 
level of risk, and inconvenience, are we willing to 
assume for the sake of maintaining our personal 
privacy? 
II 
In her essay, "Humankind as a System: Private and 
Public Agency at the Origins of Modern Liberalism,"4 
Daniela Gobetti explains how the modern concepts of 
the private and the public find their roots in the work 
of early modern Natural Law theorists who were the 
first both to formulate a conception of the "citizen" as 
the bearer of legal power, and to use the notion of 
harm, or injury, as a key criterion for distinguishing 
between the public and the private. According to 
Gobetti, Natural Law theorists employed a notion of 
injury derived from Roman law "to convey the idea 
that the violation of what belongs to a person accord-
ing to the law of nature constitutes harm.''5 Conse-
4Daniela Gobetti, "Humankind as a System: Private and 
Public Agency at the Origins of Modem Liberalism," in Pub-
lic and Private in Thought and Practice: Perspectives on a Grand 
Dichotomy, ed. Jeff Weintraub and Krishan Kumar (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Preps, 1997), 103-132. 
5Gobetti, "Humankind as1a System," 103. 
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quently, the social jurisdiction encompassed by the 
private sphere, conceived according to this principle 
of harm, includes all activities and possessions of an 
adult person which do not harm or threaten the 
safety of other private individuals. The social juris-
diction of the public sphere, on the other hand, while 
it overlaps with that of the private sphere in those in-
stances where harm has taken place, is understood as 
being in the service of privacy. In other words, the pub-
lic sphere corresponds to that collectively maintained 
authority which has the right to legitimately intrude 
upon a person's private jurisdiction either for the 
sake of preventing harm or to punish an injury al-
ready committed. It is, of course, government, acting 
in its capacity as an enforcer of common interests, 
that assumes this public role and regularly intrudes 
upon personal privacy. Ideally, governments should 
compromise individual privacy only as a way of en-
suring the safety and well-being of private individu-
als and to ensure that these individuals retain the 
ability to act out private interests without unwar-
ranted obstruction. In fact, it is precisely this limita-
tion, applied to all governmental intrusions into pri-
vate jurisdiction, that is expressed in Justice Louis 
Brandeis' consequential1928 dissenting argument in 
Olmstead v. U.S. Here Brandeis asserts that, "they [the 
founders of the Constitution] conferred, as against 
the government, the right to be let alone-the most 
comprehensive of rights, the right most valued by 
civilized man. To protect that right, every unjustifiable 
intrusion by the government upon the privacy of the 
individual, whatever the means employed, must be 
deemed a violation of the fourth amendment."6 
Of all the early contract theorists whose ideas 
comprise the foundation of modern liberalism, it was 
Jolm Locke who first explicitly employed the concept 
of injury as a means of gauging the distinction be-
tween public and private jurisdictions. In A Letter 
Concerning Toleration, Locke states the case quite 
clearly. "The part of the Magistrate," he writes, "is 
only to take care that the Commonwealth receive no 
prejudice, and that there be no Injury done to any 
man, either in Life or Estate.''7 For Locke, the legiti-
60lmstead v. U.S., 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J. dis-
senting). Quoted in Alexander Rosenberg, "Privacy as a 
Matter of Taste and Right," in The Right to Privacy, ed. Ellen 
Frankel Paul, Fred D. Miller, Jr. and Jeffrey Paul (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 84. Emphasis 
added. 
7John Locke, A Letter Concerning Toleration, ed. J. Tully 
(Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1983), 42. Quoted in 
Gobetti, "Humankind as a System," 103. 
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mate right to own property is the fundamental char-
acteristic of private life, and it was to insure that the 
right to own property remained unbroken that the 
public institution of a government was established. 
For according to Locke, objects are bound to one in 
the form of property, not through nature or through 
God's will, but through one's own labor which is ex-
pended in the act of making something. As he fa-
mously writes in the Second Treatise of Government, 
"Whatsoever then he removes out of the state that 
nature hath provided, and left it in, he hath mixed his 
labour with, and joined to it something that is his 
own, and thereby makes it his property."8 Property, 
Locke contends, is the consequence of an annexation 
of oneself, in the form of one's labor, to an object dur-
ing the process of its creation. Through this activity 
one removes an object from that assembly of things 
which, by nature, are common to all people, and 
places it among those things which are considered 
private. Consequently, any uninvited attempt on the 
part of another person to lay claim to that which isle-
gitimately constituted as private property is, for 
Locke, tantamount to a threat on one's own body. 
Since it is a person's labor which legitimates owner-
ship, and because labor is the irreducible product of a 
person's inalienable body, the bonds that tie property 
to individuals are the same as those which bind bod-
ies to the individuals whose lives reside within them. 
Defensive actions against such threats are, therefore, 
as legitimate as an individual's right to protect his or 
her own body from harm. 
The right to protect one's body is, therefore, a ba-
sic principle of privacy, and its most profound ex-
pression in Western political thought actually ap-
peared a generation before Locke in the writings of 
Thomas Hobbes who, in his Leviathan, spoke of what 
he called the "right of nature." At the beginning of 
Book XIV of Leviathan, Hobbes defines the right of 
nature, or jus naturale, as simply, "the liberty each 
man hath to use his own power, as he will himself, 
for the preservation of his own nature, that is to say, 
of his own life."9 Once again, it is a universal threat-
in this case, posed by those individuals who, in exer-
cising their own right to survival, may willingly 
harm those around them-which brings about the 
need to form a government, that is to say, the need to 
construct a public body whose purpose it is to secure 
the safety of private bodies and their property. 
8John Locke, Second Treatise of Government, ed. C. B. 
Macpherson (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1980), 19. 
9Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. Edwin Curley (Indianapo-
lis: Hackett Publishing, 1994), 79. 
What is important to recognize in all of this is that 
the formulation of modern political theory in the 
West is premised on the need to institutionalize a re-
lationship between the public and the private, and 
more specifically, that this relationship is fundamen-
tally one of security. The hypothetical decision on the 
part of those individuals living in Hobbes' fictional 
"state of nature" to relinquish a portion of their natu-
ral rights, namely, their right to do whatever they 
wish to serve their own interests, is strictly motivated 
by the fear that they may lose their lives. What the 
state of nature cannot provide to the completely au-
tonomous individual is the security necessary to act 
freely without undue fear of harm. The apparent 
paradox at the root of political authority is that one 
must sacrifice a degree of autonomy in order to save 
it. The contractual decision on the part of sovereign 
individuals to willfully reduce their autonomy for the 
sake of safety neatly illustrates the abiding connec-
tion that exists between security and privacy. Au-
tonomy, which is generally conceded to be intimately 
associated with privacy,10 must remain hindered, at 
least to a degree, if a viable state of security is to be 
established. The establishment of a secure society re-
quires that utterly sovereign individuals submit 
themselves to the authority of a sovereign whose 
power will be exercised in public- a sovereign 
whose very reason for being is a constant, though of-
ten innocuous, infringement on the private lives of 
individuals for the sake of greater security. 
To the extent that this is true, the condition for the 
possibility of security for Hobbes is the institution of 
a form of membership which is entered into when indi-
viduals agree to certain common interests. The cus-
tomary name given to this political agreement is, of 
course, the "social contract." In order to be a recipient 
of the security promised by Hobbes' political organi-
zation, individuals must join, through a contractual 
obligation, a group of other individuals who will, at 
the very least, hold one accountable for the terms of 
that contract. And it is precisely the enforcement of 
these obligations through a publicly exercised system 
of accountability in the form of a sovereign power 
that permits a state of security to prevail. Indeed, I 
will go so far as to say that, though often not immedi-
ately recognizable, all forms of security involve some 
form of membership, be they voluntary or involuntary, 
extensive or limited . And in each case, membership is 
10See Lloyd L. Weinreb, "The Right to Privacy," in The Right 
to Privacy, ed . Ellen Frankel Paul, Fred D. Miller, Jr. and Jef-
frey Paul (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 
25. 
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absolutely dependent upon the practical ability to es-
tablish and maintain the identity of its members. Re-
gardless of the type of group or the specific means of 
establishing membership, each membership group is 
defined by its ability to identify those which properly 
belong to it. If a membership group cannot identify 
its members, there is simply no group. It is the act of 
monitoring membership through the establishment 
of credible identities that, on the one hand, compro-
mises the privacy of the individuals involved, and on 
the other hand, produces the conditions for the possi-
bility of implementing security. One need only con-
sider the exponential growth in cases of so-called 
"identity theft" to recognize not only the importance 
of maintaining verifiable identities within a member-
ship group, but also that the threat posed to institu-
tions that provide security through membership is 
the increasingly likelihood that such institutions may 
not, in fact, know who their proper members are. 
III 
The model I am presenting here need not be as com-
plicated as it may seem. A few examples will help 
clarify the point. Consider the most common of secu-
rity devices, the padlock. The fact that I, as the owner 
of the lock, also possess the key which opens it, at-
tributes to me a very specific identity with respect to 
the security provided by the lock. The lock, in effect, 
"recognizes" me as being the legitimate owner of the 
lock because I have a key which verifies my identity. 
The key, in other words, acts as what is known as an 
"identity token." However, if someone steals my key 
and uses it to open the lock without my permission, 
they have thwarted the security provided by the lock 
precisely by, at least as far as the lock is concerned, 
feigning my identity. Or put differently, they have 
feigned membership in the rather small security or-
ganization which includes myself and, say, the other 
members of m y family who also have copies of the 
key. Admittedly, if someone breaks out a hammer 
and manages to bust the lock to pieces, the security 
provided by the lock has been compromised by 
means other than feigning identity, but my concern is 
not to prove that brute force is not a security risk, but 
rather to show that identity is always a significant 
component of security. When one opens a lock with a 
pick, he or she is, above all, feigning identity. 
To take another somewhat cliched example, con-
sider the case of a spy. A spy spends years learning 
how to access classified information not by directly 
assaulting the safe in which the material is kept, but 
by accumulating the criteria, i.e., the "identity to-
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kens," which allow him or her to fake membership 
and thereby gain access. Unlike the lock and key ex-
ample, the case of the spy involves a far more com-
plex set of factors. Not only does the spy need, for in-
stance, a password or a key to access the secured 
information, he or she also needs to develop a wide 
range of often non-technical characteristics in order 
to gain access, for instance, to certain meetings or cer-
tain trusted conversations. The spy must breech secu-
rity not only explicitly by acquiring a password, but 
implicitly by slowly developing trusted friendships 
and professional relationships with those who either 
possess the information themselves or represent a 
means to acquiring that information. The set of tech-
niques used to enter the trust of another person are 
important aspects of any security system because at 
its most basic level the establishment of trust, when 
done disingenuously, is a common form of feigning 
membership. 
To take an example from the world of computer 
hacking, it is too often assumed that malicious entry 
into a computer system is purely the result of pro-
gramming skills. In fact, much of the information 
necessary to breech a computer system is accumu-
lated by hackers directly from those who are fully au-
thorized to access it. By feigning the identity of, say, a 
fellow employee schooled in the specific acronyms 
and terminology of a particular type of business, it is 
quite possible to casually convince a legitimate user 
to surrender his or her password. More often than 
not all that is needed is a simple phone call. Here, as 
with the spy example, the breech of security occurred 
long before the computer account was explicitly ac-
cessed. For instance, it was the feigning of member-
ship-in a governmental institution and a private 
business- that led to direct access of secured mate-
rial. This method for manufacturing the trust that le-
gitimately exists between those associated by mem-
bership to a membership group has, at least in the 
world of hacking, a very specific and recognized 
name. It is called "social engineering." 
Before moving on to my final example, it is impor-
tant to say a word about a term that played a crucial 
part in the previous two examples, namely, access. Put 
simply, security is always a matter of access. Despite the 
seeming incongruity between securing and accessing, 
the two terms are inseparable, and not simply be-
cause they are reciprocally defined. An example I re-
cently used with my students in a course on the sub-
ject makes this quite apparent. While sitting around 
our conference table I made the claim that security is 
first and foremost a question of access. After receiv-
ing quizzical looks from around the table I asked the 
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students to play along with a simple scenario. Let us 
say I have a safe in front of me in which to secure 
some items of value. I asked my students what items 
we should secure and within a few moments we de-
cided that it should be our money. So I asked them to 
give me their money (hypothetically, of course) so 
that I could place it in the safe. I then told them I 
would lock the safe and, to be sure it was totally se-
cure, I would throw it into the nearby Chesapeake 
Bay. The point of the exercise reveals itself rather 
quickly. While the money would certainly be secure, 
for hundreds of years perhaps, it does us no good if 
we, the rightful owners, cannot access it. It is, in other 
words, easy to secure something if you never need to 
see it again. The difficulties arise precisely over the 
question of how an object can be both secure and ac-
cessible at the same time. And this is where identity 
within a membership group becomes essential. Only 
by being able to accurately identify who should, and 
who should not, be permitted to gain access to se-
cured items can a secure system hope to be viable. 
Turning now to my final and far less obvious ex-
ample, an example which sits squarely in the gray 
area between that which is and that which is not a 
compromise of security, consider the all too familiar 
occurrence of a telemarketer's evening phone call. 
The goal of the telemarketer is, of course, not to steal 
anything from you (as was the case with the spy and 
the hacker), but to sell you a product. Thus, from the 
outset the stakes are different. But as we saw in the 
two preceding examples, the breech in security hap-
pened well before the spy accesses the documents or 
the hacker enters the computer. The breech, as I sug-
gested, happened at the level of building a false sense 
of trust within a membership group of which one was 
not a legitimate member. Perhaps not surprisingly, the 
techniques used by the telemarketer to gain access to 
your wallet by persuading you to willingly part with 
your money are very similar to those used by the spy 
or the hacker, with the critical difference that the 
telemarketer must acquire legitimate consent from the 
customer. That is to say, the telemarketer must per-
suade the potential customer to give away his or her 
money in exchange for a product or service without 
falsely representing that product or service. In the case 
of the hacker, a password was freely given away and 
consent was freely given to access the information se-
cured by that password, but the intentions of the 
hacker were not legitimately represented and there-
fore the consent can also be considered illegitimate. 
Telemarketing, and for that matter all permission-
based marketing, functions by establishing a level of 
trust with customers based on more or less legitimate 
representations of both products and intentions. To 
the extent that marketing campaigns can exaggerate 
or obscure information regarding either their prod-
ucts or their intentions (particularly with respect to 
personal information acquired from consumers), they 
can legally intrude deeply into personal privacy. 
It is common for the telemarketer to use the first 
name of the person he or she is calling, for instance, 
"Hi Steve, this is Tom from Acme Insurance. How are 
you doing tonight, etc. etc." The salesperson uses this 
informal mode of address as a means of quickly 
achieving a level of familiarity with the person who 
answers the phone, thereby gaining trust, and with it 
an increased likelihood that the person will believe 
the sales pitch and purchase the product. Viewed 
from the vantage of what has been discussed above, 
however, this scenario is simply another example of 
an attempt to feign membership, in this case member-
ship into that membership circle (usually character-
ized by deep trust and, therefore, substantial security) 
called friendship. That marketing agencies pursue 
this type of feigned familiarity is beyond doubt. One 
need only turn to Seth Godin's recently published 
book on direct-marketing, unambiguously entitled, 
Permission Marketing: Turning Strangers into Friends and 
Friends into CustomersY to get a strong idea of how 
marketing functions as a type of "social engineering." 
Godin, one of the world's foremost online promoters, 
argues that gaining permission to market to a customer is 
the key to sales. Persuaded with some kind of bait-a 
free sample, a supermarket discount card, a contest, 
an 800 number, or even just an opinion survey-once 
a customer volunteers his or her time, sales are more 
likely. Be it a spy, a hacker, or a direct marketer, the 
process of "turning strangers into friends" is central to 
feigning membership so as to exploit the power of 
trust. While the legitimate consent given by the con-
sumer to have the salesperson debit his credit card ac-
count keeps this practice on the legal side of the secu-
rity line, the techniques utilized in the process of 
making the sale are quite similar to those used to 
breech security in less legal endeavors. 
The media by and large functions in a similar man-
ner, with the added distinction that what the media 
sells is not a product or a service that follows from the 
establishment of a congenial, or to use Godin's termi-
nology, a friendly relationship or trust, but is that very 
relationship itself. The media lives and dies by its audi-
11Consider a book by Seth Godin, a direct-marketing expert, 
entitled, Permission Marketing: Turning Strangers into Friends 
and Friends into Customers (New York: Simon & Schuster, 
1999). 
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ence, e.g., its readership, viewership, etc., and conse-
quently the very existence of the media is dependent 
upon the decision on the part of private individuals to 
"tune-in" to the stream of information or entertain-
ment that is being offered. Unlike the sale of stoves 
and tennis racquets, however, the media has a 
uniquely important role to play with respect to the 
functioning of democracy. It is widely conceded that 
in order for a democracy to function properly, its citi-
zenry must be kept reasonably informed of the impor-
tant issues of the day. Democratic participation-
making an informed judgment not only when voting, 
but also in local civil actions-necessitates the exist-
ence of a fair and relatively unbiased media whose 
duty it is to provide people with relevant information . 
To the degree that the media is also in the business of 
selling the relationship it has with its audience, how-
ever, the risk that the media is able to shape the views 
of its audience, due in part to their loyalty as members 
of this loosely conceived membership organization of 
viewers, remains significantly high. And this is espe-
cially worrisome when one realizes that the product 
the media is selling to its audience, the programming, 
is the very means by which the media attempts to es-
tablish a loyal viewership, i.e., a loyal membership of 
consumers. It is this "relationship of trust" that serves 
as the foundation of the media's dependable audi-
ence, but it is also this trust that presents the media 
with the dangerous opportunity to manipulate the 
opinions and desire of its audience by distributing 
leading or biased programming. 
To sum up, then, it is my contention that many, if 
not most, security threats (not to mention successful 
marketing campaigns) can productively be under-
stood as a form of forged membership. If one can 
convincingly become a member of a group without 
buying into the initial "contract" that establishes that 
group's legitimate members, then one poses a direct 
threat to the principles of stability that the contract 
seeks to maintain. A membership organization func-
tions, first and foremost, by keeping track of its mem-
bers. It is this monitoring, something which is a criti-
cal part of all security, that inevitably makes inroads 
into one's privacy. At the most basic levels, this trade-
off is quite acceptable. In the case of political mem-
bership, we give up the complete autonomy be-
queathed to us in the "state of nature" by becoming 
members of the state which in turn provides us with 
reasonable assurances of safety. But the trade-off be-
comes more difficult the more aggressive the state be-
comes in monitoring our behaviors, so much so that 
the information which once served as the very condi-
tion for security becomes a security risk itself. And 
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this is where the utilitarian consideration of harm 
arises. At what point does our desire for security be-
come overshadowed by our desire for privacy? In the 
case of the Fourth Amendment, for instance, the state 
is barred from "unreasonable searches and seizures." 
While it would, given a trustworthy government, un-
doubtedly be a more secure society if the state could 
enter our private households at will to check for ille-
gal property or potentially harmful activity, most of 
us recoil at such an idea. The reason for this is that 
our desire to maintain a high level of privacy within 
the space of our homes greatly outweighs the ben-
efits that would result from unhindered governmen-
tal searches. In other words, the harm caused by the 
invasion of privacy convincingly outweighs any ben-
efits that might be a consequence of such an intru-
sion. Thus, the amount of privacy and security we 
wish to have presents itself in the form of a classic 
moral dilemma in which these significantly contrary 
goods must be brought into balance. However, in the 
case of non-governmental organizations, and busi-
nesses and the media in particular, the trade-off is 
less clearly one between privacy and security. Indeed, 
if businesses and the media are concerned about se-
curity at all it is with their own financial security, 
which makes a business's or the media's intrusion 
into our private lives, as opposed to that of the state, 
far more risky than we often presume. 
IV 
As we have seen, the modern form of the Western 
nation state is based upon a security relationship 
which, at least in theory, seeks to preserve individual 
autonomy and the privacy that characterizes it. Indi-
vidual privacy, in the form of both private property 
and one's own body, is that which is deemed worthy 
of being secured, while the public sphere is repre-
sented by an authority that enables security precisely 
through its right to legitimately intervene into the 
private sphere (both physically and informationally) 
to prevent, manage, or punish instances of inten-
tional harm. The price paid by the individual for re-
siding in this state of security is the regulated intru-
sion into his or her private affairs, as well as the 
requirement that one become and remain a member 
of a collective (i.e., a public) organization. Likewise 
the form of punishment very often incurred by those 
who injure others and thereby infringe upon their 
personal privacy is precisely a loss of their own per-
sonal privacy insofar as imprisonment entails, in 
conjunction with confinement, a continuous state of 
surveillance of personal activities. 
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While the United States Constitution does not ex-
plicitly recognize a right to privacy, two Amend-
ments are often cited in support of such a right.l2 The 
First Amendment, which guarantees the freedom of 
religion, speech and assembly, appears to implicitly 
entail a right to privacy insofar as the freedom to en-
gage in self-expression seems to presuppose that 
such expression is permissible out of view of the pub-
lic gaze. The Fourth Amendment, on the other hand, 
has been shown to recognize privacy rights based on 
property in as much as it guarantees the "right of the 
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and effects against unreasonable searches and sei-
zures." The trouble with this claim is, of course, that 
the force of the argument turns on what exactly one 
considers property. In their 1890, groundbreaking ar-
ticle "The Right to Privacy," Samuel D. Warren and 
Louis D. Brandeis set forth the first fully conceived 
statement by the court concerning privacy rights. In 
the article, they argue that fundamental rights to life, 
liberty, and property must include not only the physi-
cal manifestations of these rights, but also their less 
tangible forms. As Warren and Brandeis put it, "the 
right to life has come to mean the right to enjoy life-
the right to be let alone; the right to liberty secures 
the exercise of extensive civil privileges; and the term 
'property' has grown to comprise every form of pos-
session-intangible as well as tangible."13 The upshot 
of their argument is that it pushes the law beyond a 
collection of torts, drawn largely from common law, 
which address specific issues of privacy, towards a 
recognition that the violation of privacy is a tort itself. 
In other words, to take an example from an article by 
A. M. Capron, instead of crafting a special provision 
to legally institute the prohibition against, for in-
stance, eavesdropping (literally listening to a conver-
sation within a private house by standing as close to 
the house as rain falling from the eaves), which had 
long been recognized in common law, the Warren-
Brandeis documents distill all matters of privacy vio-
lation into four basic areas.l4 In an article written 
12 In addition to these two Amendments, the Ninth Amend-
ment, which claims that "the enumeration in the Constitu-
tion of certain rights shall not deny or disparage others re-
tained by the people," is often cited in defense of privacy 
claims. 
13Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis, "The Right to 
Privacy," Harvard Law Review 4, no. 5 (1890), 193-220. Re-
printed in Philosophical Dimensions of Privacy: An Anthologt;, 
ed. Ferdinand David Schoeman (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1984), 75. 
14A. M. Capron, "Genetics and Insurance: Accessing and Us-
ing Private Information" in The Right to Privacy, ed. Ellen 
many years after the Warren-Brandeis piece had be-
come a benchmark for the courts, William L. Posser 
summarized the four basic categories of privacy as 
follows: 
1. Intrusion upon the plaintiff's seclusion or 
solitude, or into his or her private affairs 
2. Public disclosure of embarrassing private facts 
about the plaintiff 
3. Publicity which places the plaintiff in a false light 
in the public eye 
4. Appropriation, for the defendant's advantage, of 
the plain tiff's name or likeness 15 
The fourth category is of particular importance in as 
much as it speaks directly to the issue of assuming an 
identity for the sake of gaining access to the member-
ship group the plaintiff is associated with. However, 
it is the first category that implies the most broad 
reaching violations of privacy rights. 
While one would not have to work hard to con-
vince most people that the government has no right 
to track the goods we buy or to monitor what televi-
sion programs we watch without just cause, it is not 
so clear that non-governmental organizations, par-
ticularly businesses and private media consortiums, 
do not have such rights. As a matter of course, super-
markets, cable television operators, credit card com-
panies, Internet service providers, and the like, all en-
gage in activities which pry directly into the most 
private aspects of our lives-from the programs we 
watch to the food we eat. Each of these organizations, 
then, regularly intrudes upon what Posser referred to 
as our "private affairs." The "assumption of privacy" 
that many of us instinctively adopt when we are 
within the confines of our homes may not be as valid 
an assumption as it once was. When one is able to 
watch events in real time piped through cables into 
our living rooms, or when we are able to sit at home 
and access information stored thousands of miles 
away via an Internet connection, is it still reasonable 
to assume that these are private activities? By and 
large, Americans feel that the entertainment we en-
gage in within our homes and the information we ac-
cess for personal reasons ought to remain within the 
private sphere. We feel violated, in other words, 
when we realize that strangers know what programs 
we watched last night; we are troubled to know that 
Frankel Paul, Fred D. Miller, Jr. and Jeffrey Paul (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 239. 
15William L. Posser, "Privacy," California Law Review 48, no. 3 
(1960), 389. Quoted in Capron, "Genetics and Insurance," 
240. 
Internet sites place "cookies" on our computers so as 
to better monitor our online behaviors. Ask people if 
they would feel comfortable with anyone knowing 
exactly what they purchased in the last six months 
and many would cringe. In the same way that many 
people feel that the government's right to search our 
private property ought to be limited by law, is it not 
reasonable to expect private corporations and media 
companies to adhere to similar, though perhaps less 
stringent, restrictions? Especially because unlike the 
government, businesses have no explicit mandate (no 
"social contract") to keep the best interests of their 
customers in mind. 
Businesses and media conglomerates are growing 
increasingly inclined to gather as much information 
about their customers as possible and to use that in-
formation in complex ways, not only to tailor their 
inventory to the desires and habits of their custom-
ers, but, through direct marketing, to actively pro-
duce desires within certain predisposed demograph-
ics. As David Potter sagaciously argued in his 1954 
book, People of Plenty, marketing is "the only institu-
tion which we have for instilling new needs, for 
training people to act as consumers, for altering 
men's values, and thus for hastening their adjust-
ment to potential abundance."16 Potter's statement 
could hardly be more relevant than it is today, not 
only because our level of abundance has never been 
higher, but because the means at the disposal of mar-
keting firms to track, as well as shape, the behaviors 
of consumers has never been more powerful. While 
businesses and media companies have always sought 
to woo their customers and audiences by gathering 
information about their lives and their interests, the 
past several decades have seen this practice raised to 
a new level of efficiency, efficacy, and invasiveness. 
With the introduction of electronic means of data 
collection and information management it has now 
become feasible to track each transaction within a 
business, associate those transactions with specific 
customers, and then compare the information with 
databases collected by other businesses so as to build 
a relatively complete picture of a relevant customer 
base. Likewise, the media, by tracking each cable 
show we watch, and by measuring how long and 
how often we visit Web sites, will soon be able to tai-
lor entertainment, as well as news and informational 
programming, to specific individuals and house-
holds. The traditional model of media "broadcasting" 
16David M. Potter, People of Plenty: Economic Abundance and 
the American Character (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1954), 175. 
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is quickly being replaced by a new model, "narrow-
casting," where streams of information are directed 
to both specific individuals and well-isolated demo-
graphics. Time magazine, to take but one example, al-
ready employs such a technique, called "cluster 
analysis," to group individuals according to behav-
ioral and socio-economic similarities. It then uses the 
information gained in this process to target its publi-
cations, or more specifically the ads within its publi-
cations, to specific "market segments." Consequently, 
the issue of Time you receive at home does not con-
tain the same advertisements as those received by 
other individuals identified as being within a differ-
ent market segment.J7 
While media companies claim that target market-
ing is being done in the interest of providing the con-
sumer a more "customized" array of services, and 
while this may, to some extent, be in fact true, it is not 
at all clear that the consumer, if he or she knew the 
amount of personal information which had been 
gathered about them, would be willing to trade this 
accumulation of private information for the conve-
nience promised. Here, then, the relationship be-
tween privacy and security shifts to that between pri-
vacy and convenience, and I believe it is this trade-off 
that harbors for us the most important questions re-
garding the value of privacy for the new century. The 
question, in other words, is no longer how much pri-
vacy are we willing to sacrifice for the sake of secu-
rity, but how much private information we are will-
ing to sacrifice for convenience. The shift is a crucial 
one. In the case of the privacy/security trade-off, the 
state's intrusion into the private lives of individual 
citizens was done, at least in theory, for the sake of 
those citizens and their safety. The state, in other 
words, was established to protect people from unjus-
tified harm in their private lives. In the case of non-
governmental businesses and media companies, 
however, the safety of individuals is not a primary 
concern. When a business gathers private informa-
tion on its customers it is not doing so with the inten-
tion of protecting these customers from harm, so 
much as it is doing so to keep ahead of its competi-
tion and to generate sales revenues. It is ultimately 
for its own sake, for the sake of its own financial sur-
vival, which is to say, for the sake of its own security, 
that a business accumulates personal customer infor-
mation, even though the consumer is quite often the 
recipient of certain benefits. Without a fundamental 
170 scar H. Gandy, Jr., Operation the Panoptic Sort: A Political 
Economy of Personal Information (Boulder: Westview Press, 
1993), 88. 
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mandate to keep the consumer's interests in mind, 
that is to say, without being bound, like the state, to a 
"contract" which explicitly empowers the individual 
and his or her rights with respect to privacy, the risks 
of seeing one's personal information used to one's 
own disadvantage are significantly greater. 
of power between the individual and the state, have 
certainly not lost their relevance, but it is becoming 
increasingly clear that business and media interests 
must be directly factored into the discussion. When 
corporations can operate seamlessly across vast 
transnational territories in pursuit of their own insti-
tutional interests, it is essential to reevaluate the 
terms of the privacy debate with respect to the often 
incompatible interests of individuals, states, and cor-
porations as well as to renegotiate the issues of mem-
bership and identity embedded within them. 
Consequently, as the debates about privacy move 
into the next century, it is primarily the trade-off be-
tween privacy and convenience that must be scruti-
nized. The terms of the debate which occupied think-
ers such as Hobbes and Locke, namely, the balances 
Discussion and Reflection Questions 
1. What is "privacy"? Is there a fundamental right to privacy? How might one argue for 
such a right? How might one argue that there are limits to an individual's right to privacy 
(e.g., when it conflicts with some greater common good)? 
2. How might a conflict arise between (a) the desire to live in a society where 
individual privacy is guaranteed, and (b) the desire to live in a society safe from criminal 
activity? How might these two desires be balanced against one another to form the best 
compromise? 
3. DeCaroli describes the "assumption of privacy" that many of us instinctively adopt 
when we are within the confines of our homes, and notes that it may not be as valid as it 
once was. Why not? How does modern technology call into question the idea that what 
we do in the "privacy" of our own homes is not really as private as we might like to 
think? Do you find this a cause for concern? Why or why not? 
4. DeCaroli notes that in some ways the issue has shifted from how much privacy we 
are willing to sacrifice for security to "how much private information are we willing to 
sacrifice for convenience?" In the context of the examples he discusses, how would you 
answer this question? 
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